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Abstract. Personal photos of individuals when shared online, apart
from exhibiting a myriad of memorable details, also reveals a wide range
of private information and potentially entails privacy risks (e.g., online
harassment, tracking). To mitigate such risks, it is crucial to study tech-
niques that allow individuals to limit the private information leaked in
visual data. We tackle this problem in a novel image obfuscation frame-
work: to maximize entropy on inferences over targeted privacy attributes,
while retaining image fidelity. We approach the problem based on an
encoder-decoder style architecture, with two key novelties: (a) introduc-
ing a discriminator to perform bi-directional translation simultaneously
from multiple unpaired domains; (b) predicting an image interpolation
which maximizes uncertainty over a target set of attributes. We find our
approach generates obfuscated images faithful to the original input im-
ages, and additionally increase uncertainty by 6.2× (or up to 0.85 bits)
over the non-obfuscated counterparts.
1 Introduction
A tremendous amount of personal visual data is shared on the internet everyday
[17] e.g., camera photos shared on social networks. The wide range of private
information inadvertently leaked as a consequence is severely under-estimated
[15]. To prevent catastrophic side-effects of such privacy leakage (e.g., online
harassment, deanonymization), it is crucial to study techniques that allow users
to limit the amount of private information revealed in images before they are
shared online. To this end, we build upon recent advances in computer vision
techniques and present methods to protect the privacy of individuals in visual
data.
Specifically, we explore the notion of obfuscating selected privacy attributes
in images. Most literature around obfuscating image regions focus on detection
and masking (e.g., by blurring) a narrow set of privacy attributes – predomi-
nantly faces and license plates. However, a recent line of work [15,14] extends
these efforts to a much wider range of attributes, largely motivated that images
contain various bits of information – much like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle – which
in conjunction can compromise the individual’s privacy. In this work, we study
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targeted obfuscation of a variety of privacy attributes (e.g., hair color, facial
hair) in images, many of which cannot be clearly localized (e.g., age).
However, as a natural side-effect, obfuscation-based approaches towards ma-
nipulating images lead to destroying the ‘utility’ of images. Various concepts of
utility were explored recently. The predominant notion [5,2,19] is to define utility
w.r.t a complementary set of non-sensitive utility attributes that can be inferred
from images e.g., emotion. As a result, such formulations treat obfuscation as
a minimax game between inferences of disjoint privacy and utility attributes.
However, in this work, we hope to capture the usefulness of an obfuscated im-
age beyond a (typically small) set of categorical attributes. Consequently, our
work considers the visual quality of the image as a proxy to the utility, which is
inherently important for online photo sharing.
Our solution involves synthesizing images resembling the original input im-
age, albeit with certain privacy attributes removed. The solution is reminiscent
of a recent line of work of performing attribute manipulation on images us-
ing generative adversarial networks. However, as we will show later, attribute-
manipulation GANs pose numerous subtle problems when the task involves ma-
nipulating privacy attributes. In particular: (i) they fail to associate non-removal
of a particular attribute with a large (privacy) cost; (ii) manipulated images col-
lapse to extreme solutions (attribute present or absent), whereas the required
obfuscated solutions are typically in-between, i.e., exhibiting maximum entropy
over presence/absence of the targeted attribute; and (iii) attribute manipula-
tions fail to generalize to unseen adversaries. To tackle these challenges, we
find existing attribute-manipulation GANs limited, and work towards attribute-
obfuscation GANs.
We present a two-stage approach towards targeted obfuscation of privacy at-
tributes in images. The first stage performs attribute inversion in images: given
an input image, to toggle the presence/absence of the target attribute. We find
existing image-manipulation techniques only partially invert the attributes, and
hence fail to generalize to unseen adversaries. We tackle the partial inversion
problem by employing a novel bi-directional discriminator and additionally em-
ploy adversarial training to update the discriminator. Consequently, we find the
first stage of our approach more effective in inverting attributes than attribute-
manipulation counterparts. In the second stage, we extend our approach to per-
forming attribute obfuscation by maximizing uncertainty over the presence of
the target attribute. The key challenge here is the lack of ground-truth exam-
ples containing obfuscated images to guide the supervision. To combat this, our
second-stage model searches for the obfuscated image by interpolating the input
image and the corresponding attribute-inverted image.
We evaluate our approach on CelebA by obfuscating ten facial attributes
(e.g., gender, hair color), while keeping the generated image faithful to the origi-
nal i.e., preserving the remaining privacy attributes and image fidelity. We high-
light that our evaluation setting is more involved than existing obfuscation lit-
erature: (i) we consider a wider range of privacy attributes to obfuscate; and
(ii) we forego a constrained and limited set of categorical utility attributes, and
solely consider the broader notion of image fidelity. In this challenging setting,
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we find our approach successfully manipulate privacy attributes. For instance,
we find our approach inverts presence and absence of privacy attributes, with
84.5% accuracy, an increase of 18.5% achieved by recent image-translation model
such as StarGAN. Furthermore, apart from inverting privacy attributes, we find
our approach equally capable of obfuscating them i.e., maximizing uncertainty
of attribute predictions. Specifically, we observe an average increase of entropy
from 0.2±0.21 bits to 0.81±0.18 bits (maximum entropy = 1 bit) across in-
ferences over ten privacy attributes. Our results indicate we can significantly
reduce the amount of private information leaked by an image, while retaining
its faithfulness, and provide a viable privacy-preserving approach towards visual
information sharing.
2 Related Work
Attribute Manipulation. Generative adversarial networks (GANs) [6,11,13]
have been recently extended to edit visual attributes (e.g., changing emotions in
faces) [4,16,8,1] in images. Central to these methods is using an attribute (often
referred to as ‘domain’) classifier to guide the editing process. While these works
produce often produce photo-realistic images, they are trained to fool a fixed
known ‘adversary’ (the attribute classifier). Consequently, we find they fail to
generalize to new adversaries (unseen attribute classifiers). This is particularly
problematic from a privacy stand-point, where one does not know before-hand
the model used to infer attributes from images. To tackle the generalization
issue, our proposed method first trains the classifier in an adversarial manner
and adopts a proposed bi-path classifier to solve the confusion problem, which
is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.
Privacy-Preserving Learning. In addition to attribute manipulation, sev-
eral works propose to obfuscate private information from input images within a
GAN-based formulation. To name a few, Bertran et al. [2] learn to modify im-
ages by incorporating competition between generators and proxies of adversaries
into the training, encouraging generators to better conceal sensitive information.
Similarly, Roy et al. [19] adopts a strategy to produce privacy-preserving embed-
dings. Creager et al. [5] first learn disentangled representations with TC-VAE [3]
and supervision from attributes. During the test time, it hides sensitive infor-
mation by disabling the corresponding position in representations. While these
works are effective in concealing privacy attributes, they do not generate real-
istic images which violates the original intention of data sharing (e.g., shared
across social media). Moreover, except Creager et al. [5], these algorithms need
to define attributes in the training time and are not able to change privacy set-
tings during the test time. In this paper, we propose a framework that provides
users flexibility over a variety of sensitive attributes and obfuscate images while
retaining image fidelity, which is crucial to enable photo sharing.
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Fig. 1. Our approach involves two stages: (I) we first invert the presence of the target
attribute (e.g., gender) in the input image x to obtain x¯, followed by (II) crafting an
obfuscated image x′ as an interpolation of x and x¯ to exhibit maximum uncertainty
over the target attribute.
3 Method
In this section, we present the proposed image obfuscation framework which
provides users flexibility to remove an arbitrary subset of sensitive attributes
while retaining the fidelity of generated images. Before fleshing out the details
in the remainder of this section, we first provide an overview of our two stage
approach (shown in Fig. 1).
Stage I: Attribute Inversion. We first learn an image-to-image translation
model that performs privacy attribute inversion: given an input input x, to syn-
thesize an image x¯ (faithful to x), but where the presence/absence of the target
privacy attribute is toggled. The key ideas in our model involve: (i) training an
encoder which disentangles the visual features in the image from the attribute
information; (ii) manipulating the disentangled attribute information to signal
inversion targets; and (ii) introducing a bi-directional discriminator, which we
find crucial to alleviating issues of partial inversion of attributes. We remark that
while our approach shares some similarities with attribute manipulation strate-
gies [4,16], we tackle specific challenges to better generalize to unseen attribute
classifiers (critical when enforcing privacy), while producing photorealistic im-
ages.
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Stage II: Attribute Obfuscation. We further extend our approach to syn-
thesize obfuscated images i.e., images with high uncertainty over presence of
target attribute. As shown in the lower part of Fig. 1, we achieve obfuscation
using a mixing network, which predicts the pixel-wise linear interpolation coef-
ficients λ between the original input image x and the attribute-inverted image
x¯. Consequently, we arrive at an obfuscated but photorealstic image x′, which
displays high entropy over the target attribute.
Now, we move to discussing in detail the first- (Sections 3.1-3.3) and second-
stage (Section 3.4) of our approach to perform image obfuscation.
3.1 Attribute Inversion (Stage I): Overview
The proposed approach transforms an input image x ∈ RH×W×3 to produce a
complementary edited image x¯ via an encoder-decoder architecture. To perform
arbitrary attribute inversion during a single forward-pass, the approach allows
manipulation on the disentangled code produced by the encoder. As shown in
Figure 1, there are four sub-networks within the framework: an encoder E, a
decoder G, a compound bi-directional attribute classifier Dpos/Dneg, and an
image discriminator Dimg. We now discuss each of these sub-networks.
Disentanglement via Encoder E. To infer and decouple the underlying
information, the encoder E models the information by encoding input images
(u, c) = E(x), (1)
where u is a set of feature maps describing non-sensitive information, and c is
a vector describing sensitive attributes. The two representations are encouraged
to be independent of each other. Using the specified attribute edits (via a binary
encoded inversion mask), c is modified to c¯, which is subsequently used to sanitize
the input image.
Decoder G. With the disentangled representations, the decoder G models the
residuals that change the pixels with high information leakage risks. Formally,
we have
x¯ = x+G(u, c¯). (2)
The motivation behind the design is that most of pixels in the input image are
unrelated to sensitive information. Therefore, we can lower the cost of learning
image generation by simply modeling residuals.
Image- (Dimg) and Attribute-level Discriminators. We consider two con-
straints on the generated image x¯: (a) it should resemble realistic images; and
(b) it should fool an attribute-level discriminator trained to classify privacy at-
tributes. To tackle (a), we introduce an image-level discriminator Dimg to syn-
thesize realistic images in an adversarial manner [6]. We elaborate (b) in the next
section, as naively introducing an attribute-level discriminator is problematic.
3.2 Bi-directional Discriminator
Common to many attribute manipulation techniques is employing an attribute-
level discriminator (also referred to as domain classifier in literature) during
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Fig. 2. Attribute discriminator Dattr vs. our bi-directional discriminator Dpos ∪Dneg.
Vertical lines illustrate decision boundaries between presence and absence of attribute
‘blonde’. We find translating an input image (e.g., removing ‘blonde’ attribute in x1)
using only Dattr incorrectly encourages partially attribute-inverted images drawn close
to the decision boundary (x3). However, our discriminator learns a tighter decision
boundary (Dneg) for this translation and produces an image (x4) better representing
inversion of the attribute. We find a similarly effective translation in the other direction
as well (e.g., adding ‘blonde’ to x4 producing x1) using Dpos.
(a) Dattr (b) Dpos (c) Dneg
Fig. 3. Two-Gaussian toy dataset. We translate points in one Gaussian to the other
Gaussian and produce confidence maps by (a) a conventional classifier and a bi-
directional classifier, where (b) is Dpos aiming for positive-to-negative translation and
(c) is Dneg aiming for negative-to-positive translation. Red, blue, and yellow dots rep-
resent points in two Gaussian and translated points, respectively. Note that optimal
generation often happens near the probability 0.5. Thus, an accurate boundary could
benefit translation.
training. This discriminator (which we refer to as Dattr) is trained only on non-
generated real images and is used to provide the generatorG feedback on whether
the attribute was successfully manipulated. Directly employing Dattr for the
problem of privacy attribute manipulation leads to two challenges. We describe
the challenges and how we address them in the following paragraphs.
Discriminator Overfitting. We find training the attribute discriminator only
on real images leads to over-fitting issues, in which the model solely learns to
fool the discriminator by removing specific regions of target attributes (e.g.,
removing the bridge of eyeglasses to eliminate the activation). This increases the
risk that sensitive information can be still recognized from the processed images
and violates our goal of protecting visual privacy. To alleviate the problem, one
common approach is utilizing adversarial training by updating the discriminator
with generated images.
Partial Inversions using Dattr. Another key issue in performing attribute
manipulation in our setting using Dattr arises from high-confidence predictions
in low-density data regions. We find such discriminator feedback encourages the
generator to sample partially inverted images in the low-density region where
although the discriminator is correctly fooled, the presence/absence of the at-
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tribute is visually ambiguous due to proximity to the decision boundary. For
instance, as shown in Fig. 2, the generated images x2 and x3 (close to vertical
gray decision boundary) leads to high-confidence presence/absence predictions
(of attribute ‘blonde’), although both images are visually indistinguishable.
Bi-directional Discriminator. Our core idea to tackle the partial inversion
generation problem is to encourage tighter decision boundaries around the pos-
itive and negative classes. We achieve this using a bi-directional discriminator
composed of two attribute classifiers: Dpos (to identify positive→negative im-
age translations) and Dneg (negative→positive). In Fig. 2 this is illustrated by
the green and orange vertical lines; notice the decision boundaries are closer to
high-density regions.
We additionally validate the effectiveness of our bi-directional discriminator
over Dattr on a synthetic dataset composed of two Gaussians. As shown in Fig.
3, each Gaussian cluster represents positive/negative examples and the goal is to
ideally perform axis-aligned bi-directional translation (redblue) from one clus-
ter to another. In Fig. 3(a), we see that using Dattr leads to translated samples
(yellow points) to collapse in a low-density region near the decision boundary.
Our discriminator (Fig. 3(b, c)) produces reasonable translations (where trans-
lated yellow points are now in high-density regions) aided by tighter decision
boundaries.
We implement bi-directional discriminator using two classifiersDpos andDneg
(also illustrated in Fig. 1), where Dpos judges positive-to-negative attribute in-
version and Dneg judges negative-to-positive. We extend standard binary cross
entropy loss (Lbce) to a bi-directional loss (Lbi) to satisfy our constraint:
Lbi(x, yorg, ytar) = yorgLbce(Dpos, x, ytar) + (1− yorg)Lbce(Dneg, x, ytar), (3)
where x is the input image, yorg and ytar denote the original and target labels,
and D· is the classifier used to compute loss function. The overall objective
function is realized as follows
max
G
max
D
Lbi(x, y, y) + Lbi(x¯, y, y¯), (4)
where x¯ is translated images produced by G along with the target labels y¯. Thus,
the bi-directional classifier can be smoothly applied to perform attribute inver-
sion. In Figure 3(b, c) we observe that the bi-directional classifier can provide
tighter decision boundaries for both directions and perform effective axis-aligned
translations. Empirically, we find that the performance is sufficiently satisfactory
when the discriminator and the bi-path classifier share the same feature extractor
and only differ in the last few layers.
3.3 Learning to Invert Attributes
The proposed framework for the first stage of our approach is trained to minimize
a weighted sum of loss functions which regularize the model to achieve our goal
discussed in Section 3.1:
LG = Lrec + Lcclf + Lbi + Ladv + λ1Lutil + λ2Lreg, (5)
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where λ1 and λ2 together controls the trade-off between utility and privacy. We
introduce each loss functions in detail over the following paragraphs.
Reconstruction Loss. Given input images x, we train the encoder E to
produce disentangled representations (u, c) = E(x) to characterize attribute-
independent visual features u and disentangled attribute representation c. We
adopt an L1 loss to enforce the reconstructed images xˆ = G(u, c) to resemble
input images x:
Lrec(xˆ, x) = ‖xˆ− x‖1 . (6)
With this process, we ensure the information contained in images are well-
preserved.
Code Classification Loss. To encode the attribute information into c, a mean
square loss is imposed on c. Therefore, each element ci in c represents an binary
attribute of x.
Lcclf(c, y) = ‖c− y‖22 , (7)
where y is the ground truth of sensitive attributes.
Apart from image reconstruction, the decoder generates attribute-inverted
images x¯ = G(u, c¯) given the modified sensitive code c¯ along with the non-
sensitive code u. In particular, we first create c¯ by replacing certain elements
of c with binary variables s ∈ {0, 1}Ns ∼ Cat(K = 2, p = 0.5) and define the
modified label y¯ as follows.
y¯i =
{
s if c′i 6= ci
yi, otherwise
(8)
The number of inverted attributes Ns is determined by Cat(K =
NA
2 , p =
2
NA
),
which provides the flexibility that the model can invert multiple attributes si-
multaneously. Note that during the test time, every element ci can be arbitrary
assigned to either 0 or 1.
Bi-Directional Attribute Loss. The attribute-inverted images x¯ are required
to fool the attribute classifiers in an adversarial manner. As motivated in Sec-
tion 3.2, we apply the bi-directional loss to avoid the partial attribute inversion
problem. For the generator, we force the generated images to align with y¯.
Lbi(x¯, y, y¯) = yLbce(Dpos, x¯, y¯) + (1− y)Lbce(Dneg, x¯, y¯) (9)
The above contrasts classifiers which are typically trained to recognize the orig-
inal attributes, where m masks out positions that ci is not edited:
Lattr(x¯, y) = m · [yLbce(Dpos, x¯, y) + (1− y)Lbce(Dneg, x¯, y)], (10)
Image Adversarial Loss. In addition to fooling the attribute classifiers, we
also impose image adversarial loss to encourage the realistic image generation.
The intuition is that, without the constraint, the model could generate adver-
sarial examples to fool the attribute classifiers, which violates our motivation.
Ladv(x¯, x) = logDimg(x) + log(1−Dimg(x¯)) (11)
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Content Regularization Loss. The attribute-inverted images should resem-
ble the original images although some of attributes are modified. We additionally
introduce cycle-consistent reconstruction to the model, encouraging the model
to preserve the major content of the original images. We introduce the notion
of margin to form hinge loss, which balances the tradeoff between privacy and
content distortion.
Lreg(x¯, x) = max(‖E(x¯)− E(x)‖1 − δ1, 0), (12)
where δ1 indicates tolerance of content distortion.
Utility Loss. In addition to preserving content, non-target attributes, namely
those with unchanged ci, also need to be preserved. We ensure it by classical
binary cross entropy loss. Similarly, the loss function is controlled by the margins.
Note that we impose the loss function on both reconstructed and sanitized images
to facilitate the learning.
Lutil = max(Lbi(x¯, y)− δ2, 0),+ max(Lbi(xˆ, y)− δ3, 0), (13)
where δ2 and δ3 indicate tolerance of attribute distortion for the sanitized and
reconstructed images, respectively. The margin δ3 is often set to be zero since
attributes of reconstructed images are unchanged.
3.4 Attribute Obfuscation (Stage II)
With our model (Fig. 1) trained to minimize loss terms (Eq. 5), we are equipped
to invert attributes i.e., perform bi-directional translations by manipulating pres-
ence and absence of targeted attributes in an input. Now, we extend the approach
to obfuscate the image i.e., introduce uncertainty over targeted attributes. To
achieve obfuscation, given an input image x, we first generate its complement x¯
by inverting the presence of the target attribute. We then generate the obfus-
cated image x′ as a linear interpolation between x and x¯:
x′ = Imix(x, x¯, λ) = λx+ (1− λ)x¯, (14)
where the mixing coefficient λ ∈ [0, 1]H×W is generated to maximize the predic-
tion uncertainty with respect to the target attribute.
We train a network f to predict image-specific mixing coefficients λ:
λ = f(x, x¯, c, c¯), (15)
where x is the input image, x¯ is the attribute-inverted image, c is the sensitive
code, and c¯ is the modified sensitive code. We model f using 5 residual blocks
followed by a 1×1 filter. The network is trained to produce coefficients that lead
to obfuscated images with maximum uncertainty preserving photorealism:
Lent(x′, y′) = Ladv(x′) + Lbi(x′, y′), (16)
where Ladv encourages x′ to be realistic and Lbi encourages the interpolated
images x′ to have maximum entropy with respect to the prediction of both Dpos
and Dneg with labels y
′ (with p(y′i) set to 0.5 for target attribute i).
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3.5 Implementation Details
We implement our encoder and generator based on the U-net architecture [18]
and adopt the design of discriminators from StarGAN [4]. Additionally, we ex-
ploit TTUR [9] and Spectral Normalization [12] to stabilize adversarial learning.
We use Adam optimizers [10] with initial learning rate 1× 10−4 for the autoen-
coder and 5× 10−4 for discriminators. We train our encoder-decoder model for
300K iterations and the λ-prediction network f for 100K iterations with batch
size 128. Learning rates decrease according to the linear decay strategy.
4 Experiments
4.1 Setup
Dataset. CelebA is a dataset composed of 200000 human face images asso-
ciated with 40 attributes. We choose a subset of 10 disjoint attributes, that is
representative of sensitive information. Every input image is center-cropped by
178x178 and then resized to the resolution 128x128. We use 150000 images sorted
by indices as training data and form a balanced dataset for evaluation from the
remaining 53000 images.
Modeling the Adversary. To fairly compare our method to prior works, we
train a ResNet-18 [7] classifier on the same training data, which acts as an adver-
sary attempting to infer privacy attributes from images. The adversary ResNet
classifier used during evaluation is: (i) trained independently to our method; and
(ii) significantly more complex than the attribute discriminators in our method.
Furthermore, as this attribute classifier achieves near-perfect attribute prediction
accuracy, we argue it models a strong unseen adversary to evaluate obfuscation
techniques.
4.2 Evaluation Metrics
We now present evaluation metrics for both stages of our approach: stage 1
(which inverts the target attribute) and stage 2 (which obfuscates i.e., maximizes
uncertainty of the target attribute).
Evaluating Attribute Inversions. We consider the following metrics: (i)
True Positive Rate (TPR = TP / (TP + FN)): to evaluate how well we are
able to ‘remove’ the target attribute; (ii) True Negative Rate (TNR = TN /
(TN + FP)): to evaluate effectiveness of ‘adding’ the target attribute; and (iii)
Accuracy. Note that in all these cases, low scores imply effective inversions.
Evaluating Attribute Obfuscation. We evaluate the uncertainty perfor-
mance by comparing the posterior probabilities (using a held-out classifier F )
before (y = F (x)) and after (y¯ = F (x¯)) image obfuscation. Specifically, we con-
sider Shannon entropy H(y) to measure the uncertainty (maximum entropy =
1) and additionally observe the confidence of the prediction y (maximum uncer-
tainty at p(yi) = 0.5) to evaluate attribute obfuscation.
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Table 1. Quantitatve results for attribute inversion. Lower (adversary) scores are
better.
Blonde
hair
Eyeglass
Heavy
makeup
Male
No
beard
Pale
skin
Smiling
Wavy
hair
Wearing
lipstick
Young
T
P
R
(%
) Real 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
IcGAN [16] 61.6 12.1 39.6 43.8 97.5 44.0 15.6 53.1 46.3 75.6
StarGAN [4] 10.2 2.5 65.1 41.9 51.3 26.2 1.9 36.6 65.5 22.8
Ours 6.0 1.7 21.0 4.3 10.8 16.9 4.4 28.6 13.7 30.1
T
N
R
(%
) Real 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
IcGAN [16] 31.2 84.3 85.6 63.7 5.69 38.8 20.9 65.2 79.8 37.7
StarGAN [4] 22.7 7.5 74.5 36.7 17.2 45.2 5.4 41.4 80.3 25.0
Ours 14.3 5.5 8.0 3.3 15.3 54.6 4.0 28.6 9.3 29.3
A
cc
(%
) Real 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
IcGAN [16] 35.6 79.5 67.4 55.6 82.6 39.0 18.3 61.3 63.7 66.5
StarGAN [4] 16.4 5.0 69.8 39.3 34.3 35.7 3.6 39.0 72.9 23.9
Ours 10.2 3.6 14.5 3.7 13.1 35.7 4.2 28.6 11.5 29.7
Blonde 
hair Eyeglass
Heavy 
makeup Male No beard Pale skin Smiling Wavy hair
Wearing 
lipstick Young
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Fig. 4. Attribute inversion qualitative results. (top) input images; (middle) attribute-
inverted images by StarGAN; (bottom) our method.
4.3 Evaluation against Unseen Adversary’s Attack
We verify that our approach to invert attribute presence in images can better
conceal inferences over sensitive attributes and generalize to an unseen adver-
sary as compared to typical GAN-based models. In particular, we consider two
baselines: IcGAN [16] trains an encoder to map images to input space of a pre-
trained conditional GAN. By modifying condition vectors encoded from images,
IcGAN can manipulate attributes of corresponding inputs. On the other hand,
StarGAN [4] combines conditional GANs with cycle consistency loss to ensure
image contents. Note that attributes classifiers in both methods are designed
to solely fit the real images. To evaluate robustness against unseen adversaries,
we first sanitize images in the testing set for 10 attributes, respectively, and
then obtain the prediction accuracy from the held-out ResNet-18. Note that the
best case is to minimize accuracy because the original attributes are completely
removed.
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Table 2. Ablation study on three models with distinct classifiers.
Accuracy (%)
Blonde
hair Eyeglass
Heavy
makeup Male No beard
Pale
skin Smiling
Wavy
hair
Wearing
lipstick Young
Dattr 20.09 13.11 60.68 45.23 35.83 52.03 4.39 28.61 78.22 36.68
Dattr+AT 39.00 46.50 37.07 36.54 47.19 66.99 35.73 57.29 38.83 61.79
Ours 10.16 3.61 14.50 3.79 13.07 35.72 4.18 28.56 11.51 29.67
Quantitative Results. Table 1 presents the accuracy after sanitization in de-
tail. Real denotes the test accuracy of the hold-out classifier on test data. This
indicates the generalizability of the classifier to unseen data and ensures the cred-
ibility for the following measurement. We observe that the proposed framework
reaches the lowest TPR, TNR, and accuracy consistently on most attributes.
We find the the prior adversarial manipulation methods IcGAN and StarGAN
under-perform as they overfit to the attribute-classifier (see Section 3.2) during
training. Thus, they do not generalize well to unseen adversaries, especially for
challenging attributes such as Heavy Makeup and Male.
Qualitative Results. We visualize samples generated by our method and
StarGAN in Figure 4. Although both methods generate realistic images, our
method can better conceal attributes than StarGAN. For instance, our method
completely removes pale skin (Fig. 4f) while StarGAN only focuses on some
specific regions. In addition, our method adds more wrinkles to conceal the age
information. In contrast, StarGAN only changes the hair color slightly. Lastly,
StarGAN tends to include similar patterns to images as shown in Figure 4(c,d),
while our method can provide diverse patterns over different attributes. From the
qualitative results, we find promising results of our approach inverting attributes
in images, while being reasonably faithful to the original input image.
4.4 Ablation Study
We conduct an ablation study on three models with distinct attribute classifiers
to confirm the strength of the proposed bi-directional classifier as introduced
in Section 3.2. In particular, (i) Dattr is equipped with an attribute discrimina-
tor solely updated with real data, which is in spirit of traditional image editing
methods; (ii) Dattr+AT additionally performs adversarial training (AT) by ad-
ditionally updating Dattr using generated data; and (iii) Ours represents the
model equipped with the proposed bi-directional classifier. Note that the same
encoder-decoder architecture is adopted for all three models.
The accuracy comparison among three models is reported in Table 2. We first
observe that Dattr does not remove attributes thoroughly. Ideally, models with
adversarially trained classifiers should perform better since it iteratively learns
to identify private patterns. However, Dattr+AT performs worse than Dattr,
which confirms the partial attribute inversion problem. Lastly, Ours reaches the
best performance across all attributes. The reason is two-fold. First, updating
the discriminators with generated images makes the model generalize well to
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Table 3. Trade-off between privacy (lower is better) and utility (higher is better).
δ2 = 0 δ2 = 0.1 δ2 = 0.2
Privacy 0.155 0.147 0.130
Utility 0.863 0.807 0.781
unseen classifiers. Second, the proposed bi-directional classifier further prevents
the confusion problem.
4.5 Analysis on Trade-off Parameters
We present a study of how distinct δi values balance privacy and utility. As
discussed in Section 3.3, the proposed framework incorporates three parameters
δi to control the trade-off. In practice, δ3 is set to zero as it is related to recon-
struction, and δ1 is often set to be a small number (e.g. 0.05 for L1 norm) since
we expect lower distortion. Thus, in this study we mainly focus on the changes
of target and non-target attributes when different δ2 is provided. We denote the
accuracy for target attributes by privacy and the one for non-target attributes
by utility.
Ideally, we want to achieve the lowest privacy leakage while maximizing util-
ity. However, privacy and utility may not be fully independent, leading to a
trade-off. As shown in Table 3, our model can adjust privacy leakage level by
using different δ2. As desired, if we allow more utility distortion (i.e. larger δ2),
the lower privacy leakage is reached, while the utility distortion is also increased.
Users can find suitable parameters based on their applications.
4.6 Evaluation on Image Quality
To show that the proposed algorithm can sanitize images without significantly
sacrificing image quality, we measure Frchet Inception Distance (FID) on CelebA
for both our algorithm and StarGAN [4]. We first use each model to gener-
ate 50000 images by randomly choosing one target attribute and compute the
scores separately on two sets. According to the experiment, our method achieves
9.52 while StarGAN achieves 12.52, which is comparable. This justifies that our
method can generate sufficiently high quality images while removing sensitive
attributes.
4.7 Evaluation on Uncertainty
In the following, we show that the proposed two-stage method can secure pri-
vacy information by introducing uncertainty over certain sensitive attributes.
Specifically, we consider prediction probability and Shannon entropy to measure
privacy leakage. The goal of our method is to minimize leakage, which means
ideally, the obfuscated images should have prediction probability 50% and 1 bit
(base 2) entropy over target attributes. Moreover, since vanilla classifiers often
suffer from over-confidence problems (i.e. it only outputs either 0% or 100%)
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Table 4. Quantitative evaluation of attribute obfuscation. Better performance at this
task is indicated by higher entropy (maximum = 1 bit) and probability scores ap-
proaching 50% (i.e., chance-level). ‘Real’ denotes performance of adversary on original
non-obfuscated images, and ‘ours’ on obfuscated counterparts. ‘Gain’ denotes the dif-
ference between the two. We evaluate on both positive (input images containing the
target attribute) and negative (not containing it).
Blonde
hair
Eye-
glasses
Heavy
makeup
Male
No
beard
Pale
skin
Smiling
Wavy
hair
Wearing
lipstick
Young
Entropy (bits)
Positive → Uncertain
Real 0.56 0.59 0.53 0.12 0.13 0.68 0.30 0.57 0.43 0.24
Ours 0.75 0.82 0.77 0.84 0.87 0.71 0.81 0.66 0.82 0.79
Gain 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.72 0.74 0.03 0.51 0.09 0.38 0.54
Negative → Uncertain
Real 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.23 0.47 0.03 0.20 0.16 0.08 0.46
Ours 0.83 0.89 0.80 0.86 0.66 0.86 0.81 0.72 0.81 0.64
Gain 0.78 0.84 0.72 0.63 0.19 0.83 0.61 0.56 0.73 0.18
Probability (%)
Positive → Uncertain
Real 86.2 85.3 87.5 98.1 97.7 82.0 93.9 86.3 90.4 95.6
Ours 72.5 64.1 70.9 62.0 61.0 80.4 60.2 80.0 64.7 63.0
Gain 13.7 21.1 16.5 36.0 36.7 1.7 33.6 6.3 25.7 32.6
Negative → Uncertain
Real 0.8 0.6 1.4 4.5 10.6 0.4 3.6 2.6 1.4 10.4
Ours 44.4 47.1 37.6 38.8 22.4 49.7 39.9 38.1 38.4 20.8
Gain -43.6 -46.5 -36.2 -34.3 -11.9 -49.3 -36.3 -35.6 -37.0 -10.4
and thus cause distorted evaluation, we re-train the ResNet-18 classifier with
mix-up strategy [20], which mixes two input data and their labels to augment
the training data. With the regularization, the model allows ambiguity occurring
in predictions and thus prevent over-confident predictions.
In Table 4, we report the entropy and prediction probability, for images be-
fore (‘Real’) and after (‘Ours’) obfuscation, and their corresponding difference
(‘Gain’). We additionally group the results into ‘(Positive/Negative) → Uncer-
tain’, where Positive indicates an attribute is present in the input image, and
Negative indicating the attribute is absent. We observe that both entropy and
probability are driven toward uncertainty by a large margin, which strongly
supports the capability of the proposed two-stage method. Interestingly, we find
that the Negative→ Uncertain translation performs better than Positive→ Un-
certain most of the time. This suggests that adding new features to an image is
easier than remove information from an image.
We show in Figure 5 that our model can obfuscate sensitive attributes by
merging characteristics of original and attribute-inverted images although the
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Blonde 
hair Eyeglass
Heavy 
makeup Male No beard Pale skin Smiling Wavy hair
Wearing 
lipstick Young
Fig. 5. Visualization of obfuscated images. From top to bottom, each row presents
original images, attribute-inverted images, obfuscated images, and attention maps of
λ. For every column, we choose one attribute as a target.
images do not necessarily exist in the training data. To name a few, for hair
color (Fig. 5 (a)), the model learns to blend blonde into black hair; for male
(Fig. 5 (d)), it learns to put on light make-up on the man’s face; for pale skin
(Fig. 5 (f)), it learns to fuse the face colors. We additionally present interpolation
pixel coefficients λ in Figure 5. Surprisingly, the model automatically identifies
the regions related to sensitive attributes even though only image-level labels
are provided.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we were motivated by providing fine-grained control over private
information leakage in images. Towards this goal, we presented an approach to
obfuscate images, where the information w.r.t target privacy attributes is manip-
ulated – either by inverting the attribute, or maximizing uncertainty over it. In
spite of numerous challenges this setting presents (e.g. generating out-of-domain
obfuscated data, generalizing to unseen attribute inference attacks), we show
that images can be sufficiently altered to either introduce false information, or
minimize the information content of an attribute, while maintaining the overall
appearance of the original input image.
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Appendix
A Scatter plots
In Figure A1, we present the predicted posteriors before and after obfuscation,
with each plot denoting obfuscation of a particular attribute (indicated by title of
each plot). We further cluster the obfuscation results into images that originally
contained the attribute targeted for obfuscation (see Fig. A1a), and which did
not originally contain the attribute (see A1b).
Across all plots, we desire the predictions for the obfuscated image (i.e.,
‘ideal’) to collapse around p(y|obfuscated(x)) = 0.5, which has the maximum
entropy of 1 bit. From Figure A1, across all attributes, we observe strong perfor-
mance: the attribute predictions of obfuscated images move towards the maxi-
mum entropy region.
B Histograms of Predictions
We now visualize the distribution of inferences of attribute y, for various choices
of attributes and image manipulation strategies. Specifically, we present statistics
of binary attribute predictions p(y|x), where: (i) x = original: i.e., prediction on
the original image; (ii) x = inverted: the presence/absence of attribute y in
the image is flipped; and (iii) x = obfuscated: uncertainty over attribute y is
maximized.
Figure A2a presents the histogram over the probabilities p(y|x). We then
compute the entropies of these predictions and display them alongside in Figure
A2b. Notice in both cases, we present the results along two columns: left-column
presents statistics where the original image’s ground-truth label contains at-
tribute y, and the right-column where it does not. From these figures, we observe
that our approach is successful in inverting the attribute i.e., the blue distribution
(original images) in Fig. A2a is reasonably transformed to the yellow distribu-
tion (attribute-inverted images) on the opposite side (where p′ = 1 − p) of the
x-axis, or as the green distribution (where p′ = 0.5). We find a similar effect on
corresponding entropies in Fig. A2b. By obfuscating the images, the predictions
that were originally confident (hence low entropies in Fig. A2b) demonstrate a
larger uncertainties post-obfuscation (closer to maximum entropy of 1 bit).
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(a) Obfuscating images containing attribute y originally
(b) Obfuscating images not containing attribute y
Fig.A1. Each point in the scatter plot represents posterior probabilities before (x-axis)
and after (y-axis) obfuscating attribute yi (see plot title) in image xi. The probabilities
are obtained using a held-out classifier. The light blue marker with bars denotes the
mean and standard deviation of the distribution.
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(a) Predicted Probabilities (b) Entropies of Predictions
Fig.A2. Histogram of predictions on original and manipulated images.
